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AJASE AND OEDIPUS: IDEAS OF THE SELF IN JAPANESE 
AND WESTERN LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS 
よC.SMITH* 
Justice and Mercy 
The Supreme Court of J apan is one of the most impressive bui1dings in 
the city of Tokyo， and there is probably no finer edifice of a court of last 
resort anywhere in the world. One of the most striking features. about this 
structure， to western eyes at least， isnot the massive foyer， the size of the 
huge granite blocks， nor the fine woods and tapestries of the beautiful court 
rooms， but the status of Justice， inconspicuously placed along one of the 
walls. While many court houses display the figure of the robed woman with 
scales in one hand and a sword in the other， that of the Supreme Court of 
Japan is truly unique; the head of the sculpture is the head of the Buddha. 
Given the separation of church and state provided by the Constitution 
of Japan，1 one would not interpret this as signifying any particular unity of 
the religious and the secular. Rather， itseems to symbolize for the legal 
world the familiar idea of "Western forms and Japanese soul"? One cannot 
help but wonder: is this union a reconciled unity or an unreconciled 
dialectic? Do the diverse parts make up a new harmony or do they operate 
together in tension as a contradiction? 
Prevailing social power structures often appear as natural and inevitable， 
and history is generally interpreted to produce this impression. 1 do not， as
some Marxists might， wish to attack this tendency， which seems to be an 
* Of the Faculty of Law， University of British Colurnbia. 1 wish to acknowledge and express 
rny appreciation to the fol1owing: Professor Masako Karniya of Hokkaido University for her helpful 
suggestions and translations and explanations of texts to be found only in Japanes巴;Professor Mitsu-
kuni Yasaki， and Yoshiharu Matsuura of Osaka University， and Yoshiyuki Matsurnura of Hokkaido 
University for their kind help in rny atternpts to gain sorne understanding and insight担toJapanese 
culture and how law is viewed in Japan; to Jarnes Andersen for his rnany suggestions and editorial 
help; and to Gordon Matei for his help in the res巴archof this paper. 
1. Constitution 01 Japan (1947)， Art. 20. 
2. Wa kon yo sai. See general1y， G. B. Sansorn， The Western World and Japan (1950) at 339-51 
and 395-410; J. W. Hal1， 
Jansen， 
C印玲加a叩ngin噌t管gJapanese Attitudes Toward Modernization (1965の).
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aspect of al social ideologies. 1 would， however， concur with the Marxists 
in their recognition of the importance of identifying contradictions in order 
to gain a fuller understanding of historical development. 
All cultures contain historical contradictions. It is important to identify 
these in order to gain a fuller understanding of historical development. In 
particular， the nature of the relationship between diverse cultural elements is 
central to a proper understanding of the ethical and legal consciousness of 
a culture? If J apan has managed to reconcile the traditional spirit of its 
culture with westem legal forms， itmay well have a solution to problems 
which have long haunted the West. On the other hand， ifthe synthesis joins 
two contradictions， we might anticipate that certain aspects of traditional 
J apanese culture wi1 be eroded as a restilt. 
Another feature of the statue highlights this question. The head of the 
Buddha， unlike its westem counterparts has no blindfold. On a conventional 
statue of Justice the scale symbolizes the formal， impartial natm:e of law， the 
sword the inevitabi1ity of the penalties and remedies prescribed by law 
following transgression against it， and the blindfold the exc1usion of al 
factors， feelings， prejudices and emotions which deflect the ful operation of 
the law.4 The meaning of the blindfold is implicit in the westem maxim 
fiat justitia， ruat coelum (let justice be done though the heavens fal) or， in
an earlier form， ruat mundus (though the wor1d comes to ruin). The blind-
fold signifies that the consequences of strict1y applying the law must be shut 
out of our vision lest they influence the path of justice. This opposition， 
which is posited between the operation of justice and its consequences， is
alien to the J apanese. The unconstrained gaze of the Buddha suggests that 
emotions such as compassion can be consistent with the rule of law. 
Such a suggestion runs counter to fundamental assumptions within the 
westem legal tradition， which are reflected not only in the symbolism of the 
traditional figures of Justice which adom so many of the court rooms of the 
3. See text accompanying notes 7 and 8， infra. 
4. There are， of course， many versions of the Statue of Justice. A particularly interesting 
example can be found in Cesare Ripa's seventeenth-century work on iconography， Iconoglia. The 
figure is seated with the sword i. 1e hand and the scales in her lap. In the background is the figure 
of King Zaleucus and his son， each having one eye gouged out. The king had pa~sed a particularly 
severe law against adultery which his son had bro主en.His commitment to justice allowed no way for 
the penalty to be avoided. Th巴mostwhich he could do within the confines of justice was to sacrifice 
one of his own eyes for one of his son's in order that his son would not be totally blind. Th巴text
states that，“She (Justice) is blindfolded， for nothing but pure reason . . . should be used in making 
jl>c'v"lents." See C. Ripa， Baroque and Rococo Pictorial Imagery， trans. E. A. Maser (1971) illustra-
tion #120. 
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western world， but also in western religion， morality， philosophy， art and 
literature. These assumptions ret1ect a bifurcated view of justice and mercy. 
Mercy must function outside the legal system. Thus， judges cannot pardon. 
The prerogative of mercy belonged historically to the Crown， and is now 
exercised by the executive， its successor. The delegation to the Chancellor 
of the power to override the common law enabled a strong element of 
mercy to function in correlation with， but externally to， the law. When the 
office of the Chancellor evolved into the Courts of Chancery administering 
the law of equity， this element of mercy disappeared， so that in the mid-
eighteenthcentury Dickens chose the Court of Chancery as the recipient of 
his savage attack on the mercilessness of the legal system.5 
In the novel Billy Budd， Herman Melville has touched a chord in the 
western collective psyche， and provides us with a clear example of the con-
sequence of this bifurcation of justice and mercy.6 The story is set aboard 
a British warship at sea in 1797， when England was at war with revolutionary 
France. The plot contains three main characters:. Billy Budd， first mate 
Clegg and Captain Devere. Billy Budd is a Christ-like figure who embodies 
5. C. Dickens， Bleak House (1853). 
6. H. Melville， Billy Budd， Sailor (1924). Billy Budd has been discussed from several stand-
points. See， for example， T.Stafford， BilかBuddand the Critics (1961); H. Fran主五九“FromEmpire 
to Empire: Billy Budd， Sailor" in A. Lee， ed.， Herman Melville; Reassessments (1984) at 199. The 
structure of the namitive of BilかBuddwould泊dicatethat Melville's primary artistic aim was to 
reveal the social mythology which masks the inability of law to combine justice with compassion. 
There are many other references to the tension between justice and mercy in the western literary 
tradition. A famous巴xamplei包sf臼1臼lIniおshe児巴dby William S凱ha北ke郎sp肝巴a釘E巴i泊n
IV， Scene i， lines 182-201: 
The quality of mercy is not strained; 
lt droppeth as the gentle rain from heaven 
Upon the place beneath. lt is twice blest; 
lt blesseth him that gives and him that takes. 
'Tis mightiest in the mightiest; it becomes 
The throned monarch better than his crown. 
His sc沼ptreshows the force of temporal power， 
The attribute to awe and majesty， 
Wherein doth sit the dread and fear of kings; 
But mercy is above this scept'red sway; 
lt is enthroned in the heart of kings， 
lt is an attribute to God himself， 
And earthly power doth then show likest God's 
When mercy seasonsjustice. Therefore， Jew， 
Thoughjustice be thy plea， consider this: 
That， inthe course of justice， none of us 
Should see salvation. We do pray for mercy， 
And that same praye主dothteach us al1 to render 
The deeds of mercy. . . " 
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goodness. Clegg is basically an evil man; Captain Devere is a kind and 
compassionate officer who runs his ship efficiently biIt humanely. The plot 
is simple， as befits these archetypal figures. Clegg， whois disturbed by 
Budd's inherent innocence and goodness， attempts to destroy him by accus-
ing him of fomenting a mutiny. When confronted with this accusation in 
the presence of Clegg， Budd， whose only defect is that he is a stutterer， is
unable to articulate his outraged denia1. In frustration， he strikes Clegg with 
his fist. Clegg hits his head when he fals， and dies. 
Ki1ing an officer - indeed， merely striking an officer --was a capital 
offence in the British navy during this period. Yet， asMelvi1e isat pains to 
point out， Bil1y Budd's moral guilt is minima1. He was accused of a crime 
which could cost him his life， and， given his stutter， was defending himself in 
the only way he could. Captain Devere is thus on the horns of an excruciat-
ing dilemma; he loves the beautiful and innocent Bil1y Budd as a son， but 
knows that if the law is not followed he wil110se control of the crew. In the 
end Captain Devere obeys the law， does his “duty" and hangs Bi1y Budd. 
Although he is a good man， he cannot save Bi1y Budd; he cannot show 
mercy and stil1 remain Captain. By having the officers of the court martial 
consider and eventually reject the various arguments which they themselves 
raise in attempting to save Bil1y Budd， Melvi1e reveals two related， funda-
mental contradictions in the Judeo・Christiantradition， one pertaining to 
God， the other to law. God can be just， or He can be loving and merciful， 
but He cannot be both. Ref1ecting this dichotomy， the law can be either 
just or merciful， but not both. This contradiction between a God of justice 
and law and a God of love and mercy is ref1ected in the Judaic religious 
tradition in the dichotomy of “the Law and the Prophets". The law was 
administered by priests who taught duty to strict rules of obedience， while 
the prophets were the voice of compassion and righteousness， and were 
often critics of the law? 
The very strength of the Judaic tradition lay in the dialectical process 
which kept these contradictions in balance. There is always the danger th3.t 
emotions wil1 change. Love can turn to hatred and compassion to cruelty. 
The ties of the priests tothe legal tradition kept the prophetic tradition 
from the excesses which often accompany charismatic leadership， and kept 
it wit 
7. See A. Heschel， The Prophets (1962). 
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when acting as critics of the priests and the law， produced in ancient Israel 
one of the most humane systems of law that the wor1d has ever seen.8 
This dialectical tension is vividly ref1ected in the teachings of J esus of 
Nazareth， the last and greatest in the 1ine of prophets who constituted the 
prophetic tradition of Judaism. On the one hand he bitter1y denounced the 
priests and lawyers， the servants of the law. On the other， he asserted that 
the law was not to pass away， but was to be fulfi1ed.9 
Paul， the author of the greatest part of the body of scripture which 
makes up the New Testament， also devoted much of his thought and writing 
to the relationship between prophetic and legal justice. Paul attempted to 
solve the contradiction imp1icit in the concept of a God of compassion and 
a God of love by postulating the doctrine of the atonement whereby Jesus 
took upon himself al1 the sins (1aw breaking) of the peoples of the wor1d and 
paid with his death the pena1ty of the law. Jesus' meeting the demands of 
the law allowed God to show compassion through forgiveness. 
When Christianity was no longer a Jewish sect but had become a wor1d 
religion in its own right， this be1ief in the reconcilabi1ity of prophetic justice 
with the law faci1itated the move towards a unification of the church and 
state， which witnessed the end of the prophetic tradition.lO 
It is somewhat ironic that the most Christ鴫likefigure to appear in the 
twentieth century is Mohandas Gandhi， a product of the eastern spiritual 
tradition who， in the manner of an Old Testament prophet， decried the 
injustice of a western Christian nation. A further irony is that Gandhi was 
a lawyer， and appeared to find no contradiction between his views of law 
and of compassion and mercy. 
It is of value， in understanding the difference between J apanese and 
western legal consciousness， to contrast brief1y the view of law imp1icit in 
Billy Budd with that which is implicit in an incident which Gandhi relates in 
his autobiography， concerning his ear1y years of legal practice in South 
Africa.H Gandhi tels of a dispute arising out of a complicated business 
transaction in which his client stood either to lose or gain a substantial sum 
8. See R. d巴 Vaux，Ancient Israel， vol. 1 (1961) at 143・52;Y. Kaufmann， 1万eReligion of 
Israel (1977) at 316-40. 
9. See The New Testament， Matthew chs. 5 and 23. 
10. See J. Danielou，“Christianity as a Jewish Sect" in A. Toynbee， ed.， The Crucible of 
Christianity (1969) at 262・82，and J. H. Randall， Hellenistic Ways of Deliverance and the 1ゐkingof
the Chr.おtianSynthesis (1970) at 135 -44. 
11. M. K. Gandhi， An Autobiography; The Story of 1砂 ExperimentsWith Truth， trans. M. 
Desai (1957) at 131-34. 
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of money. Gandhi soon realized th.at the technical law was al on his side， 
and that his c1ient should be successful in any forthcoming law suit. How-
ever， he was cognizant of the fact that the parties to the suit were related 
and that both belonged to the same community. Also， ifthe case proceeded， 
both would suffer the costs of extensive litigation. He therefore persuaded 
the parties to submit the case to an arbitrator in whom they both had 
confidence. This was done and， asexpected， his c1ient won. Stil1 Gandhi 
was not satisfied， because if his client were to seek the immediate execution 
of the whole award the other party would be put into bankruptcy. Gandhi 
pleaded with his c1ient to spread the payments in modest amounts over a 
lengthy period of time. In the end， his client reluctantly accepted these 
arrangements and Gandhi was able to write that“both were happy over the 
resu1t， and both rose in the public estimation."He then went on to say that 
“[m] y joy was boundless. 1 had learnt the true practice of law . . 1 
realized that the true function of a lawyer was to unite parties riven 
asunder. "12 
While the dialectical tension between law and feeling permeates western 
legal consciousness， no such contradiction is to be found in Gandhi's view 
of law. His view， inturn， seems very compatible with Japanese legal con-
sciousnessP Much has been written by both Japanese and non-Japanese 
about the unique perspective with which the Japanese view law戸 Their
12. Id. at 134. 
13. See for example， Y. Noda， "The Character of the Japanese People and Their Conception of 
Law" in H. Tanaka， ed.， The Japanese Legal System (1976) at 301・10.
14. See for example， M. Yasaki，“Legal Culture in Jap回， Modern-Traditional" (1985) ArchiJリ
Fur Rechts-und Sezialphilosphie 168; M. Yasaki，“Law and Shakai-Tsunen as a Legal Form of 
Consensus Idea" (1982) 29 Osaka U.1.Rev. 1; M. Yasaki，“Significance of‘Legal Consciousness' ln 
Regard to Social Facts and Social Institutions" (1984) 31 Osaka U.1.Rev. 1; A. von Mehren，“Some 
Reflections on J apanese Law刊(1958)71 Harv. 1. Rev. 1486; T. Kawashima，'‘Dispute Resolution in 
Japan" in A. von Mehren，巴d.，Law in Japan (1963) 41; D. F. Henderson， Conciliation and Japanese 
Law: Tokugawa and Modern (1965); M. Maruyama，“Patterns of Individuation and the Case ofJapan: 
A Conceptual Scheme" in J紅lsen，supra， note 2 at 489; T. Kawashima，“The status of the individual in 
the notion of law， right and social order in Japan" at 429， both in C. Moore， ed.， The Status of the 
Individual in East and West (1968); 1. Dator，“Measuring Attitudes Across Cuhures" at 71 and T. 
Kawashima，“Individualism in Decision-Making in the Supreme Court of Japan" at 103， both in G. 
Shubert & D. Danelski， eds.， Comparative Judicial Behaviour (1969); C. Stevens， "Modern.Japanese 
Law as an InstrumentofComparison" (1971) 19 Am. J. Comp. 1. 665; R. Benjamin，“Images of Con-
flict Resolution and Social Control: American and Japan巴seAttitudes Toward the Adversary System" 
(1975) 19 J. of Conflict Resolution 123; Tanaka， id.; F. Upham，“Litigation and Moral Consciousness 
in Japan: An Interpretive Analysis of Four Japanese Pollution Suits" (1976) 101. & Soc'y Rev. 579; 
Y. Noda， Introduction to Japanese Law， trans. A. Angelo (1976). For contrary view see J. Haley， 
'The Myth of the Reluctant Litigant" (1978) 4 J.of Japanese Studies 359. M. Galanter， in"Reading 
the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (And Think We Know) About Our 
Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society" (983) 31 U.C.1.A. Rev. 4 at 5，釘guesthat "the 
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reluctance to litigate， their distaste for adversaIial procedures， their 
avoidance of confrontation， their preference for mediation and their desire 
to make agreements only in general terms， leaving unforeseen contingencies 
to be worked out through consu1tation and negotiation， have been widely 
discussed and need not be elaborated upon here. An examination of this 
literature enables one to recognize that the maintenance of social harmony， 
reflected in warm human relationships， isof pIime importance to the 
Japanese. To the Japanese， asto Gandhi， business relationships arise out of 
human relations. The aim of dispute settlement is the restoration of social 
harmony. This harmony rests in a sense of identity within a community， 
which is generated mainly by emotional means戸
Amae and Jibun 
According to one of Japan's most eminent psychiatrists， Dr. Takeo Doi， 
“the chief characteristic of the J apanese . . "is best expressed by the 
concept of amae. Amae“is athread that runs through al1 the vaIious 
activities of J apanese society.. . [and is the foundation of] the spiritual 
culture of Japan."16 It is c1ear from Dr. Doi's c1assical study of the Japanese 
psyche， The Anatomy 01 Dependence， that amae is intimately related to 
the emotions. 
Amae， according to the Foreword of The Anatomy of Dependence， 
“refers， initial1y， to the feeling that al normal infants at the breast harbor 
towards the mother."17 It is the noun form of the verb amaeru which is 
familiar contention that American legal institutions are overwhelmed by an unprecedented flood of 
litigation which is attributable to the excessive litigiousness of the population" is not supported by the 
data. 
15. T. Doi， 1ちeAnatomy of Dependence， trans. 1. Bester (1973) at 76. 
16. Id. at 26. While some writers and commentators have taken issue with Dr. Doi on various 
poitns， 1 have been unable to find any serious challenge to his book and its thesis. See for example 
T. Lebra， Japanese Patterns of Behaviour (1976) at 54， where the author states，“the role of 
expressing amae， called amaeru， must be complemented and supported by the role that accepts 
another's amae. The latter role is called amayakasu. Doi did not take into consideration the necessity 
of role complementarity between amaeru and amayakasu， perhaps because of the role asymmetry in 
the therapeutic relationship， where the therapist is inhibited from indulging the amae wish of the 
patient." Points such a& these are matters of expansion rather than refutation. D. Mitchell， inAmaeru 
(1976) uses Dr. Doi's thesis to expla泊“TheExpression of Reciprocal Dependency Needs in Japanese 
Politics and Law." While some have attacked this book for being simplistic or superficial， the criticism 
has generally not been of'Doi's thesis， but of Mitchell's particular application ofit. For example， see 
H. Wagatsuma， Book Review (1979) 391. of Asian Studies 173， and E. Tsurumi， Book Review (1978) 
51 Pacific Affairs 310. Of interest to Japanese readers will b邑狂 Otsuka，T. Kawashima & T. Doi， 
Amae to shakai kagaku ('Amae' and Social Science) (1976) (as yet untranslated). 
17. Supra，note15at7. 
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defined in the Foreword as follows: 
It is the behaviour of the child who desires spiritually to“snuggle Up" to the mother， 
to be enveloped in an ir凶均entlove， that is referred to in Japanese邑samaeru (the 
verb; amae is the noun). By extension， itrefers to the same behavior， whether 
unconscious or deliberately adopted， inthe adu1t. And by extension again， it refers 
to any situation in which a person assumes that he hasanother's goodwil1， or takes a 
possibly unjustifiably optimistic view of a particular situation in order to gratify his 
need to feel at one with， orindulged by， his surroundings.18 
The term amae is used to describe the feeling people have when they wish to 
be dependent upon and seek another's indulgence.19 Dr. Doi points out that 
there is no similar term to be found in European languages， but that amae 
means the same thing as was meant by Michael Balint when he termed the 
phrase “passive object love"?O According to Balint，“al the European 
languages fai1 to distinguish between active love and passive love. "21 Dr. Doi 
writes: 
1 believe that amae was traditionally the J apanese ideology - not in its original sense 
of“the study of ideas" but in its modern sense of a set of ideas， orleading concept， 
that forms the actual or potential basis for a whole social system - and stil1 is to a 
considerable extent todayP 
Dr. Doi goes on to state that he has become increasingly convinced “that 
what has traditionally been referred to vaguely as the ‘J apanese spirit' or 
the ‘soul of Yamato，' as well as more specific ‘ideologies' such as emperor 
worship and respect for the emperor system can be interpreted in terms of 
'23 amαe. 
Amae， according to Dr. Doi， isthe major component of ninfδwhich he 
roughly translates into English as human feeling?4 Giri， or social obligation， 
exists “in a kind of organic relationship" to ninfδ. Ninjo occurs spontaneゅ
18. Id. at 8. 
19. Id. 
20. M. Balint，丹imalアLoveand Psychoanalytic Technique (1965) at 56， 105， 108 and 233. 
Balint points out that it was Sandor Ferenczi who first coined the phrase and developed the idea of 
“pasive object-love". For a comparison of the psychology of dependency in western culture se for 
example， J.P. Gurian & 1. M. Gurian， TJ匂 DependencyTendency (1983); A. Memmi， Dependence， 
trans. P. Facey (1984); H. Parens & L. Saul， Dependence In Man (1971). 
21. Balint states， "In one respect， however， alEurop巴anlanguages ar巴thesame -again as far 
as 1 know them. They are al so poor that they cannot distinguish between the two kinds of object-
love， active and pasive." Ba1int， id.at 56. 
22. Supra， note 15 at 57. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. at 33. 
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ously in relationships such as those between parent and chi1d or between 
siblings. Giri， which is found in the relationship between master and pupil， 
or between friends and neighbours，“continually aspires toward ninjo." 
Giri， states Dr. Doi， isthe vessel whi1e ninfδis the content戸 Heconc1udes: 
It will be c1ear from the preceding that both giri and ninjo have their roots deep in 
amae. To put it briefly， toemphasize ninjo is to affirm amae， toencourage the other 
person's sensitivity towards amae. To emphasize giri， on the other hand， is to stress 
the human relationships contracted via amae. Or one might replace amae by the 
more abstract term “dependence，" and say that ninjδwelcomes dependence whereas 
giri binds human beings in a dependent relationship. The Japanese society of the 
past， inwhich giri and ninjo where the predominant ethical concepts， might without 
exaggeration be described as a world pervaded throughout by amae戸
In chapter four of The Anatomy of Dependence， entit1ed “The 
Pathology of Amae"， Dr. Doi describes some of the pathological states of 
mind which can arise among J apanese living within what he calls “[t] he 
world of αmae".27 Among these are taijin kyofu (anxiety in dealing with 
other people)，zs h恕αおhaishiki (sense of being a victim)，29 and in particular， 
jibun g，αnai， (to have no self).30 It is the latter which is of particular 
jurisprudential interest because the concept of the self， or of the person， is
of special significance in legal and political theory. 
According to Dr. Doi， expressions such as jibun ga aru (to have self) and 
jibun g，αnαi， (to have no self) are probably peculiar to the Japanese.“The 
interesting question... "， he states，“is why [the] J apanese [1anguage] 
should go out of its way to remark on this presence or absence"，31 since 
western languages， at least， contain no precise equivalent.32 "In the 
25. Id. at 34. See also H. Minami， Psychology ofthe Japanese People， trans. A. Ikoma (1971) at 
157 -68; M. Masatsuga， The Modern Samurai Society (1982) at 89-92. 
26. Supra， note 15 at 35. 
27. Id. at 28・64.
28. Id.at104-27. 
29. Id. at 127時32.
30. Id. at 132時41.
31. Id. at 133. Any people's colective view of the self is bound to be complex. This paper is 
attempting to focus only on a few aspects of the self from a comparative point of view. For a fuler 
discussion of the self in J apanese consciousn巴s，se Minami， supra， note 25 at 1 ・33;C. Moore， ed.， 
The Japanese Mind (1967); Masatsuga， supra， note 25 at 44-101; N. H両a母~im巴久，
individual and th巴universal among the Japan 巴釘s巴ピ"a幻t161;H. Ichiro， “The appearance of individual 
self-consciousness in Japanese religions and its historical transformations" at 227， F.Tesshi，“The 
individual in Japanese ethics" at 301， K. Masaaki，“The status and role of the individual in Japanese 
society" at 361， and T. Kawashim証，“Thestatus of the individual in the notion of law， right， and social 
order in Japan" at 429， alin Moore， supra， note 14. See also R. Smith， Japanese Society (1983) at 
68鳴105and Lebra， supra， note 16 at 156・68.
32. A western example of the kind of emotion which would correspond to amae is to be found 
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languages of the West the use of the first person pronoun is considered in 
itself adequate proof of the existence of a self."33 These two Japanese 
expressions of self define the relationship of the individual to the group.“If 
the individual is submersed completely in the group， he has no jibur人・・・
[but] an individual is said to have a jibun when he can maintain an inde-
pendent self that is never negated by membership in the groUp."34 Dr. Doi 
goes on to point out that an individual can also develop a sense of having no 
self as a resu1t of being totally isolated from the group， and that some people 
so fear such a state of affairs that they will often put Up with anything in 
order to remain within the group戸
Dr. Doi conc1udes that“man cannot possess a self without. previous 
experience of amaeru" ，36 at the same time noting that while submersion in 
the group may mean loss of the self it does not follow that one can produce 
a self by behaving selfishly and independently of the group. He further 
points out that while the problem of the development of the self “can be 
observed in a peculiarly c1ear form in the Japanese，" and the awareness of 
having a self may be easier for the Westerner than for the J apanese，“in the 
West one finds a completely reverse phenomenon in which the individual 
while in his heart of hearts harboring an extremely complex feeling toward 
the ‘absence of self，' or being in some cases aware， essentially， that he has 
no ‘self，' behaves as though he does in fact have one."37 
In comparing the western psyche with the J apanese， Dr. Doi deals with 
the western pathology of alienation， a condition which “has its u1timate 
in the New Testament， inthe First Epistle of Paul to the Corinthians. One translation reads: 
1 may speak in tongues of men or of angels， but if 1 am without love， 1 am a sounding gong 
or a clanging cymbal. 1 may have the gi丘ofprophecy， and know every hidden truth; 1 may have 
faith strong enough to move mountains; but if 1 have no love， 1 am nothing. 1 may dole out al 1 
possess， or even give my body to be burnt， but if 1 have no love， 1 am none the better. Love is 
patient; love is kind and envies no one. Love is never boastful， nor conceited， nor rude; never 
selfish， not quick to take offense. Love keeps no scor巴 ofwrongs; does not gloat over other 
men's sins， but delights in the truth. There is nothing love cannot face; there is no limit to its 
faith， its hope and its endurance. . In a word there are three things that last for ever; faith， 
hope， and love; but the greatest of them al is love. (11切NewEnglish Bible， 1 Cor. 13: 1・13)
In the traditional King J ames version of the New Testament， the GIeek word agape is translated 
as "charity"， a word that hardly conveys the true meaning of this passage， and is evidenc巴ofthe fact 
that the English language does not contain a term adequate to this concept. One of the dictionary 
meanings of agape is“non-sexuallove." 
33. Supra， note 15 at 133. 
34. Id. at 134. 
35. Id. at 138. 
36. Id. at 139. 
37. Id. at 140. 
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origin in the dis:::overy that rnan was rnistaken in believing . . . thathe could 
stand on his own feet and be self-sufficient through reason alone."38 "Men 
sense a drying-up of the springs of life， and in order to recover what has been 
lost they deterrnine that they will retum， asit were， to their naked selves， 
will1ive once rnore by feeling rather than reason. And in this new quest they 
are being led . . . to amae."39 “Wh~n the infant is left by its rnother，" he 
writes，“it feels an uneasiness， a threat to its very life; and it seerns likely that 
it is precisely this feeling that lies at the heart of what is described by 
rnodem rnan as “hurnan alienation.' "40 
There is no question that the idea and concept of individual freedorn is 
a part of westem consciousness， and that the demand for freedom is closely 
interrelated with the ernphasis in westem culture on individuality. Dr. Doi 
goes on to ask this penetrating question:“Is the freedom of the individual， 
that magnificent article of faith for the modem westem world， really to be 
believed担，or is it merely an illusion cherished by one section of the popula-
tion of the West?"41 He suggests that the incisive analyseS' of Marx， 
Nietzsche and Freud have seriously undermined faith in freedom and that 
the West “as we see it today is caught in a morass of despair and nihilism."42 
The westem idea of freedom， ifit is to mean something rnore than the 
simple gratification of individual desires， must entail “solidarity with others 
through participation" and rnust u1timately mean something very similar to 
the Japanese idea of amae.43 He writes: 
In short， deposite the precedence he (Western man) gives in theory to the individual 
over the group， there must exist inside him a psychological desire to“belong". This 
is， inother words， amae. And this desire， one suspects， is gradually coming to the 
surface of the consciousness now that the Western faith in freedom of the individual 
is breaking down.44 
The "/" and the “We" 
Psychoanalysis， the terrn coined by Freud， isconcemed with the analysis 
of the soul， or what J ung terrned the “self". The terms “psyche"，“soul" 
38. Id. at 148. 
39. Id. at 149. 
40. Id. at 150. 
41. Id. at 94. 
42. Id. at 95. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. at 141. 
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and “self" mean much the same thing is psychoanalytic usage， and may be 
taken to be interchangeable戸Itis not surprising that Freud produced an 
ego psychology， since the subjects of his analysis were psyches which 
developed in a westem cultural context. This explains why the ego (Latin)， 
ich (German) or the “1" (English) played such a prominent role in Freud's 
analysis of the self.46 According to Freud， part of the ego resides in the 
unconscious， which justifies our postulating an “I剛consciousness"and an 
“I-unconsciousness".47 Jung， having delved into eastem religion， phil-
osophy， art and mythology， developed the idea of the collective unconscious 
which he contrasted with the pers6nal unconscious勾 Dr.Robert Pos uses 
the term “the We-unconscious" instead of the term “collective unconsci幽
ous". He contrasts this with the “I-unconscious"の Thisthen allows us to 
replace the ego or ich with the I-conscious. From Dr. Do凶i'sanalysis of the 
Japanese ps可ychei託tiおsclear t出ha計twe need to add “We.屯.
have a psychoanalytic framework of analysis of the psyche which allows 
cross-cu1tural comparisons. 
Dr. Doi's thesis is that “man cannot possess a self without previous 
experience of amaeru."SO At the same time， however， he recognizes the 
importance of freedom and autonomy (which is a part of the spirituallegacy 
of westem cu1ture) for a richer and fuller development of the self. This is 
to say that a well-developed self should have both a strong I-consciousness 
and a strong We-consciou~ness. Keeping in mind the existence of the un-
conscious， we can use the following model to analyze the processes of 
identification and differentiation， interms of which individuals develop their 
own sense of self: 
45. See B. Bettelheim， Freud and Man せSoul(982) at 70・78.
46. Id. at 53・56.
47. See Standard Editl切1of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud，“The Ego 
and the Id，" vol. 19 (1961) 1 at 18;“New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis，" vol. 22 (1964) 
at 69-80. 
48. See generally， inThe Collected Works of C. G. Jung， 2d ed.， vol. 7 (1966)“On the Psy-
chology of the Unconscious" 1 at 64但79，"The Relations Between the Ego and the Unconscious" 120 
at 127-38. In vol. 9:1 ofthe same edition see “τh巴Conceptof the Collective Unconscious" 42-53. 
49. Dr. Robert Pos， Clinical Professor of Psychiatry at the University of British Columbia， and 
Director of Clinical Services of the Forensic Psychiatry Institute of British Columbia. 
50. Supra， note 15 at 139. 
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The process of development of the self commences in infancy as the 
chi1d starts to recognize its separateness from the mother. I-consciousness is 
produced by differentiating the self from the external wor1d， inc1uding 
other persons. When a chi1d individuates itself from its mother， itdevelops 
an awareness of gender differentiation which the child wi1 later learn is 
culturally identified with its biological sex戸 Asthe chi1d separates itself 
from its mother， itbegins to learn that it is a member of a fami1y. Whi1e 
identifying his or her self with the fami1y， the child is differentiating itself 
from other persons， inc1uding its parents and siblings. In gender-polarized 
human societies， itis extremely difficult for any chi1d to develop a sense of 
self without a distinct gender identification. Gender identification comes 
about through identification with the gender groupings of male and female. 
Thus I-consciousness and We-consciousness develop in harmony with each 
other. Differentiation from others takes place in terms of the varying sets of 
group identities， and therefore inevitably involves identification. Our sex， 
fami1y， extended fami1y， tribe， language group and nationa1ity are al a part 
of our personal identity. The relationship between the “1" and the “We"， 
therefore， isdistorted when it is construed as a dialectic between two con-
f1icting poles in terms of which we must strike a balance. There can be no 
“1" without a “We"， nor conversely， a “We" without a set of“I"s. 
A strong sense of the “I"component is developed within people when 
they are allowed， encouraged and taught to be autonomous individuals， 
freely making their own choices and taking responsibi1ity for them. The 
western tradition has always recognized the c10se 1ink between freedom or 
51. See for example S. Bem， ，‘Gender Schema Theory: A Cognitive Account of Sex Typing" 
(1981) 88 Psych. Rev. 354; M. Mahler， F. Pine & A. Berman， The Psychological Birth of the Human 
lnfant (1975); J. Money & A. Ehrhardt， Man and Woman， Boy and Girl: The Differentiation and 
Dimorphism of Gender ldentity from Conception to Maturity (1974); A. Oakley， Sex， Gender， and 
Society (1972); R. J. Stoller， Sex and Gender， vol. 1; The Development of Masculinity and Femininity 
(1974); L. Duberman， Gender and Sex in Society (1975). 
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liberty and responsibility戸 Takingresponsibility for one's actions， how-
ever， means choosing those actions in terms of their possible effect on other 
people. A strong sense of the “We" is developed when a person receives love 
and support within the fami1y， and co-operation， fellowship， good feeling 
and compassion from the group. At the same time， few people can develop 
a strong sense of the “1" without having a sense of appreciation and status 
within the group， since our evaluation of ourselves will generally reflect to 
some degree that of the group. It is， of course， possible to have a strong 
I-consciousness in conjunction with a very weak We-consciousness. Such 
persons will suffer from some form of pathology such as alienation. The 
psychopath who is incapable of empathy for anyone else and who judges al 
action only in terms of his or her own immediate wants or desires is a c1assic 
example. 
There is little evidence of any physical difference between the brains of 
the various races of humanity. Rather， differences are best explained in 
terms of cultural experience. T. P. Kasulis writes， 
the assumption that people in different cultures actual1y think different1y in some 
inherent way is untenable . . . [T]he difference among traditions derives not from 
variance in inherent thinking patterns， but from differences in whlit is thought 
about. . . In summation， there is no prima facie reason to abandon the hypothesis 
that the logical form of rationality is the same around the world. R丘ther，the 
divergence between cultures lies in the traditional concerns of rationality， and there. 
fore， the experiences to which logic is applied. Human experience is too complex to 
be ana1yzed al1 at once. A tradition must be selective， choosing certain points to be 
examined first and others deferred until some later time. But once the initial topics 
are chosen， their complexity leads to ever further analysis and enrichment. New 
terms are developed and the answer to one question carries in its wake the beginnings 
of the next question. A tradition sedom has the leisure to return to those ex-
periences initial1y bracketed from consideration. At the same time， ineach culture 
certain forms of human experience come to be understood as being particularly 
profound or revealing. The experiences even become intensified as they are self. 
consciously named and analyzed. In short， each culture specializes， asit were， inthe 
cultivation and analysis of particular human posibilities. This is why intel1ectual 
traditions diverge as much as they do.S3 
To the degree that the East views the self differently than the West， that 
difference will be echoed in the networks of institutions and conceptual 
structures upon which various cultures have developed a view of the world: 
52. S. Coval & J. C. Smith， Law and Its Presuppositions (1986) chs. 1-3; R. Wolff，In Defence 
of Anarchism (1970). 
53. T. P. Kasulis，“Reference and Symbol in Plato's Cratylus and Kukai's Shojijissogi" (1ヲ82)
32 PhiIosophy East and West 393 at 404. 
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[T]he Western mind is: analtyical， discriminative， differential， inductive， indi-
vidualistic， intellectual， objective， scientific， generalizing， conceptual， schematic， 
impersonal， legalistic， organizing， power-wielding， self-assertive， disposed to impose 
its will upon others， etc. Against these Western traits those of the East can be 
ch呈racterizedas follows: synthetic， totalizing， integrative， non-discriminative， deduc-
tive， nonsystematic， dogmatic， intuitive，.. nondiscursive， subjective， spiritually 
individualistic and socially group-minded， etc.54 
Within the eastern tradition， Buddhism， which has had a profound 
impact on the development of the J apanese psyche， has produced the most 
well-articulated doctrine of the self戸 TheBuddhist tradition recognizes the 
temporal， passing， impermanent and changing nature of the ego， and by so 
doing finds the true self trhough identification with universal oneness. 
According to the Lama Anagarika Govinda: 
He who wants to follow the Path of the Buddha must give up al thoughts of“r 
and “mine". But this giving up does not make us poorer; it actually makes us richer， 
because what we renounce and destroy are the walls the kept us imprisoned; and 
what we gain is that supreme freedom， according to which every individual is 
essentially connected with al that exists， thus embracing al living beings in his own 
mind， taking part in their deepest experience， sharing sorrow and joy.56 
Govinda further states that “al individuals . . . have the whole universe as 
their common ground， and this universality becomes conscious in the 
experience of enlightenment， in which the individual awakens into his true 
all-em bracing nature. "57 Kasulis writes，“the rejection of the self as an 
independent agent separate from the web of interconnected conditioned 
causes is called in Sanskrit the doctrine of anatrnan ('no・ego';. . . muga in 
Japanese)."S8 The great Zen teacher Rinzai is reported to have related that 
“in this clump of raw flesh . . . there is a true person of no status continually 
entering and exiting (your sense organs)."S9 
54.“Lecutres on Zen Buddhism" in D. Suzuki， E.Fromm & R. de Martino， eds.， Zen Buddhism 
and Psychoanalysis (1960) 1 at5. See also H. Nakamura， Ways of Thinking of Eastern Peoples (1964); 
F. S. C. Northrop， The Meeting of East and West (946). 
5. See for example S. Picken， Buddhism， Japan注 CulturalIdentity (1982); H. Shinsho， 
“Buddhism of the One Great Vehicle (Mahayana)" at 33 and U. Yoshifumi，“The Status of the 
lndividual in Mahayana Buddhist Philosophy" at 164， both in Moore， supra， note 31; S. Ando， Zen 
and Americanη'anscendentalism (970) at 7 -52; Suzuki， supra， note 54 at 24-43. 
56. Cited by N. Jacobsom， Buddhism and the Contemporary World (1983) at 84. 
57. A. Govinda， Creative Meditation and Multi-Dimensional Consciousness (976) at 10. 
58. T. P. Kasulis， Zen Action Zen Person (1981) at 4. 
59. Mu i shin jin， id.at 51. See also Suzuki， supra， note 54 at 32. 
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The lndividual and the Community 
Even a cursory exarnination of the rnajor institutional and cultural 
strearns of East and West reveals that the concept of the self in the West is 
very different frorn that in the East. The institutions and belief systerns 
which $ have helped forrnulate I-consciousnessjunconsciousness and Wか
consciousnessjunconsciousness in the West， tend to be contradictory. The 
stress on individualisrn in westem culture is a product of a belief systern， a 
central feature of which is a .set of fundarnental or natural rights which 
guarantee or protect personal liberty by preventing wrongful interference. 
One of the rnost basic tenets of this set is the right of equality before the 
law. By assurning the existence of such a right， rnatters of sex， orderof 
birth， farni1y rnernbership， race or skin colour becorne irrelevant for the 
purposes of our rnoral and legal rights and duties. Frorn the rnoral point of 
view we are sirnply autonornous agents， frorn the political point of view we 
are rnerely citizens， and at law we are “legal" persons. In westem law the 
legal person can be useful1y conceived as a variable in a forrnulaic equation. 
Thus a contract can be conceived in the abstract as a legal relationship 
between any two persons， Pl and P2， in問gardto any particular pattem of 
behaviour not prohibited by law叩
However， our gender identity， order ofbirth， farnily， colour and race are 
critical rnatters in forrnulating the We-consciousness which is an essential 
part of our concept of self. Thus the conceptual frarne-work within which 
we forrnulate a part of our I-consciousness conf1icts with the kind of 
conceptual frarnework within which we develop our Wかconsciousness.
The result is substantial dialectical tension within the westem psyche. 
Consider， for exarnple， the conceptual structure of fundarnental rights and 
the corresponding idea of a social order based on a universal law of reason 
rooted in Stoicisrn and classical Rornan law. This structure is in contradiひ
tion with the dernocratic view of law as ref1ecting the will of the rnajority 
which is to be norrnatively evaluated in terrns of transcendental ideals of 
the good or the just rooted in tum in Platonic and Aristotelian ideas of the 
state. This fundarnental conf1ict between individual rights and the wi1 of 
the rnajority stil1 perrneates westem law and pblitics.61 The debates between 
6ωo. See D. De佼r汁ham，民，
Political Plルurali，おsmη1(1958)a託t5; F. Lawson， '‘Th 
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theorists such as Nozick and Rawls，62 Dworkin and Hart63 or Hayek and 
Bay;64 the dispute between judicial activists and conservatives;65 the 
contrast between forrnal justice and social or distributive justice，6 and 
between liberty ahd equality;67 and the range of the political spectrum 
between the poles of statism and libertarianism: 68 these exemplify the 
bifurcated conceptual framework within which western legal and political 
institutions function. Within a truly consistent democracy the will of the 
majority rules supreme. Minority rights can have no meaning in the face of 
the “wil1 of the people". 
Utilitarianism， which postulates the ideal of the greatest good for the 
greatest number， isthe natural ethical counterpart to democratic political 
theory. Given that good is taken to mean pleasure， and that the people 
concerned are the best judges of what pleases them， then law can be taken 
to be the will of the majority produced through the political legislative 
process. On the other hand， a theory of law from which a doctrine of funda-
mental rights can be derived entai1s a concept of law which is deduced from 
principles which exist independently of what people think about them. 
62. R. Nozick， Anarchy， State， and Utopia (1974); J. Rawls， A 7万eory01 Justice (1971). 
63. R. Dworkin， Taking Rights Seriously (1977); H. L. A. Hart， Essays In Jurisprudence and 
Philosophy (1983) at 49-87 and 123噂58.
64. F. Hayek， 7克eConstitution 01 Liberty (1960)， and Rules and Order， vol. 1 of Lの¥1， Legisla. 
tion， and Liberty (1973); C. Bay， F子omContract to Community (1978) at 29， and “Hayek's Liberal-
ism: The Constitution of Perpetual Privi1ege" (1971) 1 The Political Sci巴nceReviewer 93. 
65. J. Thayer，“The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law" (1893) 
7 Harv. L. Rev. 129 at 143・44;L. Hand， 7売eBil 01 Rights (1958) at 11-15; A. Bickel， The Least 
Dangerous Branch (1962); C. McCleskey， "Judica1 Review in a Democracy: A Dissenting Opinion" 
(1966) 3 Hous. L. Rev. 354; S. Halpern & C. Lamb， eds.， Supreme Court Activism and Restraint 
(1982). 
66. For an example of an analysis of formal justice see J. C. Smith， Legal Obligation (1976) at 
88-108 and 233-43. For an analysis of social or distributive justice， see for example D. Miller， Social 
Justice (1976); B. Ackerman， Social Justice in the Liberal State (1980); Rawls， supra， note 62. See 
a1so P. Ingram，“Procedural Equality" and P. Doy，“Proc巴duralEqua1ity: A Replay to Mr. Ingram"泊
S. Guest & A. Milne， Equality and Discrimination:・Essaysin Freedom and Justice (1985) at 39-59. 
67. Liberty and equality (in an egalitarian sense， ascontrasted with the more formal concept of 
equality， asis entai1ed in the idea of eq百alitybefore the law) are conversely related in that the more 
government controls the acquisition of goods and services in order to achieve an equitable distribution， 
the more it must interfere and regulate market transactions and individual consumption. On the other 
hand， the fewer restrictions placed by government on these economic processes， the greater will be the 
development of economic inequalities between citizens. See for example D. Raphael， Justice and 
Liberty (1980) at 57 -73; J. Lucas， On Justice (1980) at 197 -207. 
68. For a defence of a social ord巴rfounded on the state， see M. Sandel， Liberalism and the 
Limits 01 Justice (1982); M. Sandel，“The Procedural Republic and the Un巴ncumberedSelf" in 
(1984) 12 Political Theory 81 at 82; Rawls， supra， note 62. For a defence of no state or merely a 
minima1 state， see: Wolff， supra， note 52; Nozick，supra， note 62;M. Rothbard， The Ethics 01 Liber砂
(1982). See also W. Lang，“Marxi 
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Thus， the institution of a democratical1y elected legislature limited by a bi1 
of fundamental rights enforced by judicial review is not the product of a 
unified political and legal perspective. Rather it is a dialectical synthesis 
which al10ws us to continue to live with the contradictions， and to benefit 
from the energy which is a product of this dialectical tension.69. Japan 
inherits these contradictions in its post-Wor1d War 1 Constitution. 
The philosophical， religious and spiritual traditions of the East， by view綱
ing the ego as illusionary， and by focusing on the relatedness of al1 persons 
and things， facilitates a strong We-consciousness and a weak I-consciousness 
in the formulation of a concept of the self. In the West the focus on 
individual agency with its related doctrines of autonomy， freedom and 
responsibi1ity leads to a view of the self with a strong I-consciousness but a 
weakWかconsciousness.
The illusory nature of freedom in the westem tradition and the alienか
tion which is characteristic of westem man stems at least in part from the 
lack of an emotional foundation for We-consciousness in the West. This is 
illustrated by R. L. Rubenstein， in his brilliant but sadly neglected The 
Cunning of History， who argues that the holocaust was not an aberration of 
history resu1ting from a temporary madness、ofa particular set of people at a 
particular time， but rather “was an expression of some of the most signifi-
cant. po1itical， moral， religious and demographic tendencies of Westem 
civi1zation in the twentieth century."70 The bureaucratic process which 
produced the holocaust， according to Rubenstein，“can be understood as 
a structural and organizational expression of the related processes of 
secularization， disenchantment of the world， and rationalization."71 “The 
culture that made the death camps possible，" he writes，“was not only 
indigenous to the West but was an outcome， albeit unforeseen and un-
69. See Coval & Smith， supra， note 52. T. Lowi's， 1ちeEnd of Liberalism， 2d ed. (1979) 
furnishes an analysis of the political process in the United States which allows one to follow this 
dialectic in American politicallife. The dialectic has taken a different cours巴inCanada. In 1960 the 
Canadian Parliament passed the Canadian Bil of Rights， R.S.C. 1960， c.44 as an ordinary act of the 
legislature. In The Queen v. Drybones [1970] S.C.R. 282，in a six to three judgment the Court took 
the position that the Canadian Bil of Rights gav巴 thecourts the power to declare an act， or part 
thereof， of Patliament to be invalid if it infringed a provision of the Bill of Rなhts.InA.G. ofCanada 
v. Lavell [1974] S.C.R. 1349， the Supreme Court of Canada reversed its巴lfon this point. The issue 
was finally resolved by political means with the adoption of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms as Part 1 of the Constitution Act， 1982. Even so， section 33 provid巴sthat Parliamente or 
any provincial legislature c阻 declarelegislation operative notwithstanding sections 2 or 7 to 15 of 
the Charter， which contain most of th巴fundamentalfreedoms. 
70. The Cunning of History: The Holocaust and the American Future (1978) at 6. 
71. Id.at27. 
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intended， of its fundamenta1 . . . traditions."72 The h010caust， s1avery and 
the condition of industria1 workers in ninettenth幽centuryEng1and are al 
examp1es of objectification of human beings. Rubenstein shows that in 
order to treat peop1e as objects their humanity must first be denied; in other 
words， they must be exc1uded from our We-consciousness. 
At an intellectua11evel the western legal and political traditions proc1aim 
the equality and brotherhood of al mankind， but no strong emotional basis 
has ev01ved to sustain a We-consciousness which goes much beyond the 
immediate fami1y. Examples from a variety lof eras and cu1tures serve to 
demonstrate this. The Greeks fai1ed to extend freedom and equality to their 
women and slaves?3 Classica1 Stoic Rome retained s1avery and tolerated the 
most crue1 abuses?4 The English tradition of liberty fai1ed to prevent 
imterialism， and the Americans practiced cu1tura1 and sometimes even 
physica1 genocide on their aborigina1 inhabitants戸 A1so，the Americans 
maintained the institution of s1avery in the South with 1aws which permitted 
and 1egalized extreme crue1ty， in spite of the Declaration olIndependence 
and the Bill 01 Rights?6 S1avery was not abolished in the United States 
unti1 individua1s， compelled by human compassion， created a groundswell of 
feeling which made politica1 action necessary and possib1e. The advance-
ment which the B1ack civil rights movement made in the 1ate 1950s and ear1y 
sixties resu1ted from a short圃livedwave of compassion which led to concrete 
changes in the 1aw. These faci1tated further progress after the wave of 
emotion had ebbed. Peop1e who participated in the civil rights movement of 
that period sti1l vivid1y remember the strong emotional bond which brought 
b1ack and white together in marches and political protests. The song，“We 
72. Id. at 31. 
73. See for example P. Slater， The Glory of Hera (1968); S. Pomeroy， Goddesses， Whores， Wives 
and Slaves: Women in Classical Antiquity (1975) at 57-87; W. Westermann，“Slavery and the 
Elements of Freedom in Ancient Greece" at 17， M. Finley，“Was Greek Civilization Based on Slave 
Labour?" at 53， R. Schlaifer，“Greek Theories of Slavery from Homer to Aristotle" at 93，回dG. 
Vlastos，“Slavery in Plato's Republic" at 133， al in M. Finley，巴d.，Slavery in Classical Antiquity 
(1960). 
74. Institutes of Roman Law by Gaius， trans. E. Poste (1904) at 37. Poste， inhis commentary 
on the law relating to slavery， writes that “the condition of the slave was at its worst in the golden 
period of Roman history" and at 38 states that“Roman law to the end， unli】ceother legislations 
which have recognized forms of slavery， r巴fusedto admit any rights in the slave." 
75. See for example D. Brown， Bury 1砂Heartat Wounded Knee (1970). 
76. W. Jordan， The White M仰せ Burden(1974) at 59-64， 81・83，150・52;M. Tushnet， The 
American Law of Slavery (1981). Three c1assic studies of slavery in America are: F. Tannenbaum， 
Slaves and Citizen: The Negro in the Americas (1947); S. Elkins， Slavery:・AProblem in American 
Institutional and Intellectual Life， 3d ed. (1976); D. Davis， 1克eProblem of Slavery in Western Culture 
(1966). 
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Shall Overcome" became a focus for that feeling. Finally， notwithstanding 
the highest idea1s of Marxist egalitarianism， mi1ions of peop1e have died in 
the Gulag slave 1abour camps of the Soviet Union，77 whi1e in Cambodia， the 
Marxist Khmer Rouge slaughtered between one and three mi1ion of their 
own citizens.78 
By appealing to the deep spiritua1 roots of Hinduism， Is1am and 
Christianity， Mohandas Gandhi， a sing1e individua1， generated an emotiona1 
wave which brought about the withdrawa1 of the British from India in a way 
that wou1d not have been Ipossib1e through force of arms or politica1 
manoeuvring.79 His Muslim friend and associate Abdu1 Ghaffar Khan used 
similar methods and socia1 forces to 1ead 100，000 fierce Pathans， who in 
taking an oath of non-vio1ence achieved power far beyond that which the 
possession of arms had given them.80 The 1esson of history is c1ear. Progress 
towards the goa1s of universa1 freedom and respect se1dom goes beyond what 
can be achieved through an emotiona1 sense of identity with others. 
Although the westem 1ega1 and politica1 tradition has broken conceptua1 
barriers and paradigms which retarded the ext白ens託ionof the emotiona1 sense 
Oぱfsolidarity and identification which generates We.心.
t討ioni泊ni託ts鵠e1fis se1dom ab1e to generate that emotion. This is so because the 
westem socia1 paradigm is， by its nature， an obstac1e to We-consciousness. 
The twentieth century marks the westemization of the wor1d: as non-
westem countries have industrialized to protect themse1ves and to compete， 
they have found it necessary to adopt westem techno10gy and westem forms 
of socia1 and politica1 organization. Yet no other century has seen the 
slaughter， cruelty and vio1ence which the twentieth century has produced戸
77. See A. 1. Solzhenitsyn， The Gulag Archipelago， vol. 1 (1974)， vol. I (1975)， vol. II (1978); 
A. Shifrin， 17包eFirst Guidebook to Prisons and Concentration Camps of the Soviet Union (1980). 
78. W. Shawcr.os， The Quality of Mercy: Cambodia， Holocaust and Modern Conscience (1984) 
at45-69. 
79. See for example: E. Eriks.on， Gandhi's Truth (1969); W. H. Shirer， Gandhi (1979); L. 
Co1lins & D. Lapierre， Freedom At Midnight (1976). 
80. E. Easwaran， A M如 toMatch His Mountains (1984). 
81. G. Eli.ot， inTwentieth Century Book of the Dead (1972) at 211-34 estimates that approxi-
mately one hundred mi1lion people have b巴enslaughtered as. the direct result of official government 
action or decree. If one tries to duplicate hfs calculations， starting with the Turkish genocide of the 
Armenians at the beginnfng of the century， adding the casualties of Wor1d War 1， and contfnufng 
through with the estimates of other wars， revolutions， slave labour and death camps， Eliot's startling 
figure appears t.o be fair1y accurate. To dwel! on one detai1， the presence of torture tel!s a great deal 
about the nature of societies and states， and the relati.onship of the individual to the state. The 
revival of torture fn the twentieth century and its widespread use by persons and institutions as an 
instrument .of government also provides a good indicati.on that western civilization has fai1ed to 
develop strong emotional bonds between people. See f.or example the Amnesty International Report， 
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The westem legal and political tradition has attempted to achieve a sense 
of community identification through transcendental ideas of morality， 
justice or goodness. Such ideological paths to community inevitably fail， 
since conflicting theories or views of what is the good， and the tendency of 
people to interpret the good or justice in terms of their own self interests， 
prevent a shared consensus regarding the ideals which the community should 
ref1ect. The inevitable failure of people to achieve their ideals even when a 
consensus can be reached tends to fracture rather than consolidate a sense of 
community. In any case， logic， argument and intellectualization cannot in 
themselves produce the emotional basis for the sense of We-consciousness 
which must exist for true community. 
Nothing brings to our awareness more c1early the vast chasm between 
the ideals of westem civi1zation and its realities than does the holocaust. 
This terrible event haunts the consciousness of westem man because the 
holocaust marks the breaking of a “hitherto unbreachable moral and 
political baηier in the history ofWestem civilization"戸
There is no contradiction between I-consciousness and We-consciousness 
when the latter is based on emotional identification or feeling， since 
community based on feeling is consensual community and is therefore 
consistent with the autonomy of the individual. The dichotomy between 
individuality and community which plays such a major role in westem 
political theory is a rather artificial distinction when we take into account 
that the very thought processes of consciousness which make the concept of 
the individual possible， entail language， which is a social phenomenon 
impossible outside of the context of a community. Part of the prob1em is 
the tendency to think of community only in political terms， so that 
communities not based on political organization are ignored. Consequently 
we only look for political solution to social ils. The rich variety of 
communities and social practices which exist independently of the political 
process and which contribute greatly to human welfare tend to be dis自
counted in academic kinds of analyses. 
There is no contradiction between autonomy and the fundamental 
Torture in the Eighties (1984)， and E. Peters， Torture (1985) at 74-187. When we comp釘esocieties， 
nations and cu1tures， Japan巴sesociety， held together by the emotional bonds which are the product 
of the world of amae is truly a unique social phenomenon. And even if it is the case that the buraku-
min and J apanese residents of Korean ancestry have not been fully brought into the circle of amae， it
stil remains， inour fragment巴dworld， a success yet to be achiev巴dby other peoples. 
82. Rubenstein， supra， note 70. 
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rights which fumish its necessary condition， and the resolution of disputes 
through mediation. It has been argued that traditional J apanese law and 
dispute resolution methods did not involve rights consciousness and con-
sequently there is a discontinuity between the westem legal system， which 
J apan has adopted in the process of modemization， and traditional J apanese 
dispute settlement mechanisms.83 Much stress is put on the fact that Japan 
has far fewer lawyers per capita， fewer law suits and a greater tendency to 
use mediation over litigation， than is to be found in other countries having 
a westem legal system. The prevai1ing view ref1ected in this literature is 
that the westem legal tradition erttai1s universal rules， while the Japanese 
legal tradition stresses the uniqueness of each particular situation， and 
therefore the uniqueness of the particular resolution of the dispute. The 
problem with this literature is that American legal consciousness is treated 
as representative of westem legal consciousness， with the resu1t that people 
fail to realize that rights consciousness does not necessarily entail litigious-
ness consciousness. The methods of dispute set1ement are among the least 
important aspects of westem law. Arbitration and mediation are becoming 
widespread in America as forms of dispute set1ement， particular1y in the 
areas of labour， commercial and matrimoniallaw. This experience ref1ects 
no basic discontinuities or contradictions. Western law is consistent with 
many different forms of dispute sett1ement mechanisms， inc1uding media-
tion. 
That which makes westem law truly unique is its individualistic concept 
of the self， and the idea of individual liberty which is derived from it戸
Legalism or rulism can equally be a disease of non-western legal systems. 
China， for example， has gone through periods of extreme legalism戸
Since autonomy entails no transcendental norms of social justice or the 
good other than those which are necessary to guar:mtee the freedom of 
action of each individual， tothe extent that it is consistent with the freedom 
of action of others， itis inconsistent with what Professor Shklar calls 
“legalism" and what Professor Yasaki cal1s “rulism，" which invites 
83. See supra， note 14 for a selection of articles discussing this debate. 
84. See in general F. S. C. Northrop， The Complexity of Legal and Ethical Experience (1959) at 
106，143-64 and 183-215; Srnith & Weisstub，日eWestern Idea of Law， supra， note 61; 1. C. Srnith， 
“The Unique Nature of the Concepts ofWestern Law" (1968) 46 Can. Bar Rev. 191. 
85. See T. Ch'u， Lawand Socie砂 inTraditional China (1965) at 226-79; 17匂 T'AngCode， 
trans. W. Johnson (1979). 
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adversarial confrontation and Iitigation戸 AIso，there is no contradiction 
between autonomy and Buddhism. To respect the agency of people is to 
respect the uniqueness and spontaneous creativity of human life. 
The idea of freedom， however， inthe western legal and poIitical tradition 
is very different from that of freedom in the Buddhist tradition. The 
western idea of freedom stresses freedom in relation to human action， and 
entails two types of liberty: freedom from wrongful interference with 
human action， and freedom to do what one wants to do so far as is con-
sistent with the freedom of others from interference. The idea of freedom 
in the Buddhist tradition relates les to action itself， and more to freedom 
from illusory limitations which， ifshed， would transform human actions.87 
Autonomy and fundamental rights， contrary to the view of the Marxists， 
do not necessarily entail a reification of the “1" .88 Compassion and feeling 
lead to seeing the “1" in the “We" and the “We" in the “Iでinother words， 
to a proper view of the self wherein the “1" and the “We" are in balance. 
The western juridical tradition defines the “1" in terms which are universal 
86. J. Shklar， Legalism (1964) at 1; M. Yasaki，“Legal Cu1ture in Japan， Modern-Traditional" 
(Paper delivered at the 11th World Congress of the Int巴rnationalAssociation for Philosophy of Law 
and Social Philosophy， Helsinki， 1983) [unpublished]. 
87. See N. Jacobson， supra， note 56 at 85-117. At 86-87， Jacobson describes the difference 
between the western concept of freedorn and that which is irnplicit in Buddhisrn as fullows: 
The legacy of European learning irnpresses upon the rninds of rnen and wornen everywhere 
the conclusions which a few tens of thousands - alrnost exclusively nonpigrnented， rnale， 
rniddle-class， and Occidental-have found helpful in their drive for values. We of this universe 
are now confronted with the task of freeing life on this good earth frorn these assurnptions and 
one-sided perspectives which have carried the baton of civilization during the last three hundred 
years， assurnptions and viewpoints which have placed the fertility of hurnan experience at large 
under a strange enthralrnent to second and third-harid conclusions regarding the nature and rnean-
ing of life . ..The chief role of Buddhisrn now is to increase the freedorn rnen and wornen can 
enjoy frorn the pathological cornpulsions of life. The Buddhist legacy is prepared to participate 
in opening the lives of rnillions to new flexibility in discov巴ringthe rneansing of life， thus provid暢
ing ways of curing p巴opleof the egocentricity and narcissisrn that rnount to pathological heights 
of self-worship in sorne parts of th巴presentwor1d. 
88. K. Marx，“On the Jewish Question" in D. McL巴llen，巴d.& trans.， Karl Marx Early Texts 
(1971) at 104. Marx writes，“Thus none of the so-cal1ed rights of rnan goes beyond egoistic rnan， rnan 
as he is in civil society， narnely an individual withdrawn behind his private interests and whirns and 
separated frorn the coIhrnunity." Marxists are correct in assurning that fundarnental rights perrnit 
persons to be egoistic and selfish. However， itdoes not fol1ow frorn this that巴goisrnwil1 be the in-
evitable result of recognizing fundarnental rights. Nor does it follow that their d巴nialrernoves a barrier 
to achi巴vingcornmunity. The failure of cornrnunist political systerns to eradicate egoistic rnan， soably 
analyzed by Milovan町ilasin The New Qass (1957)， would indicate that the.ernotional foundations 
necessary for the sense of We-consciousness which is required for the developrn巴ntof a non-egoistic 
self， cannot be achie 
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for al human beings，89 and the Buddhist tradition reveals what is true or 
non-illusory or real within the “1" and furnishes another basis for uni崎
versality in the oneness of alllife. J ust as there is no meaning in the western 
juridical tradition for social hierarchy， there is likewise no meaning for social 
hierarchy in the Buddhist tradition with its concept of the self as mu i shin 
jin一一“trueperson without status"?O Consequently， Buddhism is always 
found in conjunction with some other conceptual structure which can 
provide such a meaning. The concept of the true self is very similar if not 
almost identical in philosophicall五nduismand Taoism. Hinduism， however， 
derives meaning for social hierarchy from its stress on status and caste; 
Taoism coexisted with Confuciansim which provided a basis for status and 
hierarchy; and Shintoism has served a similar function in Japan. Thus the 
eastern religious and political traditions contain a fundamental contradic-
tion which， although different， runs parallel to a similar contradiction in 
the West. 
Paternαlism and Mαternalism 
Whether there is a contradiction between autonomy and αmαe is a 
difficult issue. Since in its narrowest usage in ordinary J apanese discourse， 
amae refers to the desire which a child has to cling to its mother， amae 
appears to represent a relationship where one wishes to lose autonomy by 
relying on a substitute mother figure戸 Fromthis view αmae points to 
dependency， whereas western culture stresses an autonomy based on 
equality between agents. The relationship between mother and child is very 
complex， however， and neither should autonomy and αmae be posited as 
simple opposites. Both autonomy andαmae presuppose certain psycho-
logical states of mind. According to Doi， amae also implies some awareness 
of individualism. The collectiveness which is so characteristic of Japanese 
society always co-existed with the ambition to be first， or outstanding， and 
it never denied the possibi1ty of acting on one's own戸Ifthese states can 
89. The western juridical tradition of the autonomy of the individual， equality before the law 
and law as the rule of reason rather than the will of individuals or any class of individuals， contains no 
meaning for social hierarchy. The dialectical tensions within the western legal and political traditions 
referred to in notes 61-69 supra， are a product of the contradiction between the juridicial paradigm 
and th巴politicalparadigm which was evolved by the Greeks in order to legitimize the continuation of 
human aomination rendered illegitimate by the juridical paradigm. 
90. See supra， notes 56-59. 
91. The Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan， vol. 1 at 48. 
92. See T. Doi， Omote to ura (Front and Back) (1985) at 55. 
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be said to be consistent with each other， then it is highly likely that the 
concepts which presuppose them can also co-exist without contradiction. 
Therefore， to investigate the relationship between autonomy and αmae it is 
necessary to explore the psychology underlying these concepts. 
A particularly striking i1lustration of the psychological aspect of auto-
nbmy is provided by the oldest reference to freedom which exists in any 
written text. This is a Sumerian document circa 2350 B.C. The word which 
the Sumerians used to refer to the concept of freedom was αmargi， which 
means literally “retum to the mother" .93 The experts on ancient Sumerian 
culture admit that they have absolutely no idea why， when “we find the 
word‘freedom' used for the first time in man's recorded history"， this 
particular figure of speech came to be used.94 
To understand why and how “retum to the mother" came to mean 
freedom we would need to know what one was tuming from in“the retum". 
This first appearance of the word amargi was in a Sumerian document which 
“records a sweeping reform of a whole series of prevalent abuses， most of 
which could be traced to a ubiquitous and obnoxious bureaucracy consisting 
of the ruler and his palace coterie"， and which also “provides a grim and 
ominous picture of man's cruelty toward man on al levels - social， 
economic， political and psychological"?S 
What the turning was from is revealed by the context within which the 
word amargi or freedom appears; it was a tuming from law and the authority 
of kingship. But what did the “retum to the mother" consist of， and why 
was this state equated with freedom? An examination of the preliterate 
history of this area as reconstructed through archaeological evidence and the 
ear1iest recorded myths suggests an answer. The ear1iest Sumerians 
worshipped the Goddess Inanna?6 Evidence suggests that women held a 
high status which was gradually lost with the development of patriarchy in 
the form of a transition to the worship of male gods， kingship and the rise 
of law. Throughout much of Europe and the Middle East (as well as many 
other parts of the world) are to be found numerous female figurines and 
93. S. Kramer， The Sumerians (1963) at 79. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. 
96. S. Teubal， Sarah the Priestess:・TheFirst Matriarch 01 Genesis (1984) at 77-131; E. Fisher， 
Woman s Creation: Sexual Evolution and the Shaping 01 Socieぴ(1979)at 267 -80; W. Thompson， 
The Time Falling Bodies Take To Light: .iIかthology，Sexuality， and the Origins olCulture (1981) at 
159-208. 
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sculpture， dating from the upper Paleolithic period into the Bronze Age， and 
even beyond， which suggest an age of matriarchal consciousness when a 
goddess was worshipped and women were held in high esteem and played an 
important， ifnot leading， cultural and societal role.97 
The archaeological evidence uncovered at the site of the ancient town of 
Catal Huyuki in Anatolia， for example， which covered approximately thirty-
two acres and had a population of several thousand people， furnishes 
evidence of a period in which women were afforded a high status of such a 
nature as to be inconsistent with a patriarchal culture. For example， women 
and children were buried under the large central platforms of houses 
while men were buried in smaller corner spaces along with their hunting 
98 weapons. 
Many of the ancient Japanese myths suggest that Japanese society was 
also probably matriarchal originally. These myths are to be found in the 
Kojiki and Nihon Shoki.99 The first ruler of the world was the Sun Goddess 
Amaterasu Omikami， who was the direct ancestor of the first Emperor of 
J apan. The earliest indication of the existence of J apan in Chinese literature 
stated that the country was ruled by a female by the name of Himiko.lOO 
Itsue Takamura studied matrimonial systems in ancient J apan and came to 
the conclusion that early J apan was matriarchal and matrilineaP01 Freedom 
as“the return to. the mother" would mean， therefore， a return to The 
Mother， that is to matriarchal consciousness， which、wouldmean a return 
from kingship to collective social order， from law to custom and from 
“masculine political power" to“feminine cultural authority" .102 
Freud believed that the evolution of human culture followed a similar 
pattern to the evolution of the individual human psyche; consequent1y， 
human history can be interpreted in terms of the Oedipus complex.103 
Freud's theory of the Oedipus complex explains how the male child makes 
97. Se in general， E. Neuman， The Great Mother， trans. R. Manhiem， 2d ed. (1963); E. O. 
James， The Cult 01 the Mother Goddess (1959); M. Gimbutas， The Goddesses and Gods 01 Old Europe 
(982); M. Stone， When God Was A Woman (1976). 
98. Se J. Melart， Catal Huyuk: A Neolithic Town in Anatolia (1967). For a critique of 
Melart s巴巴1.Todd， Catal Huyuk in Perspective (1976). Se also M. French， Beyond Power (1985) 
at 46; Thompson， supra， note 96 atI38-50. 
9. Se S. Iida， ed.， Nihon shoki shinko (New Lectures on Japanese Tales) vol. 1 (1936) 29緋69.
10. Chin Jin， ed.， Gishi wajin den (Chinese Literature on Japan). 
101. Se 1. Takamure， Bokeisei no kenkyu (A Study on Matrilineage) (1938) and Sho seikon no 
kenkyu (A Study on Marriage as an Incorporation of the Groom to the BridぜsFamily) (1953). 
102. Thompson， supra， note 96 at 149. 
103. S. Freud，“Totem and Taboo，" Standard Edition， supra， note 47， vol. 13 (1964). 
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the transition from a continuity with and an affection for the mother， in
which the child sees the father cast as a rival， toa positive identification with 
the father accompanied by a disparagement of women. In this way the age 
of matriarchal consciousness can be viewed as the paral1el of the period of 
the male child's close identification with the mother， and the rise of patri-
archy as the equivalent of the male child's shift of allegiance from the 
mother to the father. Freud himself did not take this view of matriarchy. 
He accepted that historically there had been such a period， but he believed 
that this was only a temporary development in the stages of patriarchy 
which arose after the killing of the father by the brothers when they 
renounced control over women in order to be able to live at peace with one 
another.104 Some of Freud's staunchest supporters， however， would disagree 
with him on this question. N. O. Brown， for example， writes: 
The proper starting point for a Freudian anthropology is the pre-Oedipal mother. 
What is given by nature， inthe family， is the dependence of the child on the mother. 
Male domination must be grasped as a secondary formation， the product of the 
child's revo1t against the primal mother， bequeathed to adu1thood and cu1ture by the 
castration complex. Freudian anthropology must therefore turn from Freud's pre-
occupation with patriarchal monotheism; it must take out of the hands of Jungian 
Schwarmerei the exploitation of Bachofen's great discovery of the religion of the 
Great Mother， a substratum underlying the religion of the Father-the anthropo-
logical analogue to Freud's discovery of the Oedipal mother underlying the Oedipal 
father， and comparable， like Freud's， tothe discovery ofMinoan-Mycenaean civiliza-
tion underlying Greek civilization.105 
It is the fear of castration which spurs the shift from a positive view of 
the mother and a negative view of the father to a positive view of males and 
a negative view of females. The father is interna1ized in the form of the 
super-ego， and the Oedipus complex is transcended when the individual is 
able to escape the father complex by the development of a strong ego 
through the renunciation of i1lusion， and the acceptance of the reality 
principle. The development of the myth of the social contract to ensure 
equa1ity between brothers after the ki1ling of the primal father could then be 
said to correspond to the escape from the father complex as the male's own 
ego matures. 
Eli Sagan， inhis study of the complex cu1tures which bridge the gap 
between primitive societies and the archaic civilizations which are their 
104. Id. at 131. 
105. N. Brown， Life Against Death (1959) at 126. 
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successors， compares the development of these societies with the pre幽Oedipal
stages of the development of infants戸6 Using Margaret S. Mahler's three 
stages of the psychological birth of the self in the human infant: autism， 
symbiosis and separation and individuation，107 Sagan shows that human 
societies themselves go through parallel processes， with comparable psychic 
trauma， when they separate from the kinship system as monarchy develops. 
He has thus developed a psychoanalytic social theory based on a triadic 
interrelationship between society， the family and the individual psyche.108 
His model is equally app1icable to psychoanalytic jurisprudence. 
Jerome Frank， among others， has explained law in Freudian terms as 
a father substitute.109 Law can thus be viewed as the public projection 
of the super-ego. The individual male's escape from the father complex 
is faci1itated by the creation of institutional substitutes， the primary one 
being the state. To the degree that people require father substitutes in the 
form of institutional domination， they sti1 remain under the influence of 
the Oedipus complex. 
Professor Takeyoshi Kawashima， relying in part of Frank's Freudian 
analysis of law， contrasts the westem view， which he terms “patemalism" ， 
with that of the J apanese， which is patemalism moderated by the 
psychology of amαe which he terms “matema1ism". According to Professor 
Kawashima， this is the source of the J apanese dis1ike for the rigid app1ication 
of rules and the desire to achieve social harmony 、throughwarm human 
relationsPO For him， at least， there appears to be no conflict between 
amae and autonomy. He writes that: 
the Japanese traditionally expect that in principle social obligations wil be fulfiled 
by a voluntary act on the part of the person under obligation， usually with particular 
friendliness or benevolence . . . .τhe actual value of social obligation depends upon 
the good wil and favour of the obligated person. . . 111 
What amae and autonomy have in common， and what therefore makes them 
consistent with each other， isvoluntariness. 
106. E. Sagan， At the Dawn of乃Iranny:1百eOrigins of Individualism， Political Oppression and 
the State (1985). 
107. M. Mahler， F.Pine & A. Bergman， supra， note 55. 
108. Supra， note 106 at 348. 
109. J. Frank， Lawand the Modern Mind (1930). 
110. Otsuka， Kawashima & Doi， supra， note 16 at 146 and 188-92. 
111. T. Kawashima，“The status of the individual in the notion of law， right， and social order" 
in Moore， supra， note 14 at 430. 
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Where a dependency relationship is maintained on the basis of human 
fee1ing， al of the parties to the relationship are in it of their own free will， 
given that some need makes one of them dependent upon the other. The 
persons who are dependent upon others retain their autonomy so long as the 
people upon whom they are dependent do not take advantage of their 
dependency to force them to act contrary to their wil. 
The matemal principle was first expounded by the pioneer of J apanese 
psychoanalysis， Heisaku Furusawa，u2 He .describes the psyche of the 
J apanese male in terms of what he cals the “Ajase complex". Ajase was the 
prince of Osha Castle in ancient India. In the actual Buddhist text， the story 
is about a father and son relationship in which the son kils his father but is 
forgiven by his father from heaven. In the story as modified by Furusawa 
and Okonogi to match the Japanese psyche， Ajase was the son of King 
Binbashara who was converted to Buddhism by his wife Idake. Idake feared 
that the king might lose interest in her as her features were not as they used 
to be. She thought that the only was to guarantee his continued affection 
was to have a son. She was told by a prophet that a wizard 1iving in the 
forest would die in three years time， and would be reincarnated as her son. 
As she was too anxious to wait three years， she contrived to cause the 
wizard's death and become pregnant. The prophet had a1so told her that the 
son wou1d kil his father. Fearing the spite of the yet o be born wizard-son， 
and having second thoughts， she sought to abort the unborn child， which was 
1ater de1ivered in a tower. Ajase was loving1y raised by his parents and on1y 
discovered the secret of his conception and birth at maturity. After much 
agony of spirit caused by the 10ss of his idealistic view of his mother， Ajase 
decided to kil Idake. At the moment of formulating this resolution， Ajase 
was swept with gui1t， causing him to shake with fever and to break out into 
malignant sores which produced a terrib1e smell. Because of the stench， 
everyone deserted him except his mother， who forgave him for reso1ving to 
kil her. With a silent and 10ving devotion she nursed and cared for him. 
Ajase， now aware of his mother's sacrifice and suffering， intum forgave her， 
112. Heisaku Furusawa， Zaiaku ishigi no nishu， (Two Kinds of Feeling of Gui1t) (1931); S. 
Yamamoto & K. Okonogi， Nihon]・inno Shakai Byori (SocialPathology of the Japanese) (1982) at 
68-88. 1 am greateful to professor Yoshiyuki Mats.umura who drew my attention the Ajase complex 
in his paper， "The Role of Law in Western and Eastern Societies" (unpublished). He there states that 
“this story of Ajase is similar to mabuta no haha (literally，‘mother of eyelids'， meaning the mother 
from whom he has been separated since his childhood， a popular drama in Japan) and presents the 
original form of the common mother-chi1d experience through which we Japanese must pass without 
fai1 to reach maturity." 
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and mother and son recovered their original oneness. 
The Ajase complex does not seem to be an alternative to the Oedipus 
complex， but is rather a culturally different expression of it， inthe sense that 
both represent in mythic form the painful process of genderization which 
humans endure in the passage from infancy to adulthood. The Ajase myth 
marks a reconciliation with the mother which is missing in the western form 
of the complex. The maternal principle， reflected in the permeations of 
amae through Japanese culture， isabsent in the West. 
Preud believed that since women do not experience castration anxiety， 
they maintain a pre-Oedipal attachment to their mothers and consequently 
do not fully develop super幽egos. “1cannot evade the notionぺwrotePreud， 
“that for a woman the level of what is ethically normal is different from 
what it is in men . . . they show les sense of justice . . . andare more often 
influenced in their judgements by feelings....叶 13 The Swiss child 
psychologist Jean Piaget noted that boys displayed an inc1ination to follow 
rules， and a facility in their application， while girls tended to be more 
pragmatic and les inc1ined to follow rules slavishly in their games and 
behaviour.114 The Harvard psychologist， Lawrence瓦ohlberg，devised a scale 
of levels of moral development in terms of facility in the use of rules and 
logical consistency in reaching moral judgments， upon which he tested men 
and women， and conc1uded that women fel substantially lower on the 
scaleYs Carol Gilligan， a Harvard colleague of Kohlberg， confirms that 
there is a difference between the way boys and girls， and men and women， 
approach moral disputes and rules; however， in her study In A Different 
Voice， she strips away the aura of superiority which is given to the masculine 
..1~ 116 moae. 
Gilligan， who worked with Kohlberg in some of his research with 
children， discusses a typical reaction of a boy， Jake， and a girl， Amy， to a 
moral dilemma which Kohlberg posed to a group of eleven year olds to 
measure their moral development. The dilemma was whether a man who 
requires a drug to save his wife's life， and can not afford to purchase it， 
113. S. Freud，“Some Psychical Consequences of the Anatomical Distinction Betwe巴nthe 
Sexes"， Standard Edition， supra， note 47， vol. 19 (1961) at 257 -58. 
114. J. Piaget， TI匂 MoralJudgement o[ the Child (1965)， Six Psychological Studies， trans. A. 
Tenser (1967)， Structuralism， trans. and ed. C. Maschler (1970). 
115. L. Kohlberg， The Philosophy o[ Moral Development (1981);“A Cognitive Developmental 
Analysis of Sex-Role Concepts and Attitudes" in E. Maccoby， ed.， The Development o[ Sex Di[[er-
ences (1966) at 82・173.
116. C. Gilligan (1982)ー
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should steal it. J ake was c1ear that the man should steal the drug because a 
life was more valuable than property. Amy， on the other hand， considered 
neither property nor law， but was more concemed about the various human 
relationships which were involved in the situation. She responded，“if he 
stole the drug， he might save his wife then， but if he did， he might have to 
go to jail， and then his wife might get sicker again， and he couldn't get more 
of the drug， and it might not be good. So， they should really just talk it out 
and find some other way to make the money." Gi1igan comments， 
seeing in the dilemma not a math problem with humans but丘narrativeof relation-
ships that extends over time， Amy envisions the wife's continuing need for her 
husband and the husband's continuing concern for his wife and seeks to respond to 
the drugist's need in a way that would sustain rather than sever the connection.117 
There would appear to be some striking similarities between the 
approach and attitude of the J apanese to dispute set1ement and rules and 
that taken by women in the West， which seem to justify Kawashima's use of 
the term matemal principle and its connection to amae， incontrast to the 
patemal principle.18 The patemal principle dictates the obedience of an 
inferior in a hierarchical social order to a superior who has the authority to 
lay down rules for which obedience can be demanded as a duty. The 
matema1 principle reflects the nurturing relationship whereby a dependent 
person can impose upon the love or emotionally需basedgood will of another 
for the satisfaction of a need. Each principle leads to a different form of 
We-consciousness. The patemal principle encourages individuals to define 
their selves in terms of their place in a hierarchical social order， while the 
matemal principle seeks a definition of the self in terms of relationships 
of dependency and mutual dependency. Autonomy， therefore， isin-
consistent with the patemal principle， but consistent with the matema1. To 
the degree that amae represents the matemal principle， itis consistent with 
autonomy. When， however， patemalistic relations of domination are set in 
terms of αmae， contradictions arise. 
All of this must inevitably lead to the conclusion that the contradiction 
in westem legal consciousness between legal justice on the one hand， and 
mercy， love， emotion or what has been called prophetic justice in the J udeo-
Christian tradition， on the other， has its origins at least in part in gender 
117. Id. at 25-32. 
118. Supra， note 111. 
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bifurcation. Thus we can conclude that there is a fundamental relationship 
between western legal consciousness and the Oedipus complex. The identifi-
cation of law with authority， authority with the father， and the father with 
the state， whi1e at the same time identifying love， mercy and emotion with 
the mother， and excluding the mother from power， helps insure the separa-
tion of law and human emotion which is so characteristic of the western 
legal tradition. 
The Ajase complex explains why the inf1uence of amae permeates 
J apanese legal consciousness， rather than coalescing as a contradictory pole， 
as in the western tradition， even though J apan also has a patriarchal culture. 
In the Ajase complex the son returns to the mother. The reconci1iation of 
the son to the mother is thus ref1ected in the particular view which the 
J apanese take of law， rules， justice and dispute settlement. 
Freud， however， considered a return to the mother as an impediment 
to the development. of the self. He viewed it as a form of wishfulfil1ment 
which left one within the grips of the Oedipus complex， never able to 
transcend it. This accounts in part for his positive evaluation of the 
mascu1ine and his negative evaluation of the feminine，119 and furnishes a 
possible explanation for the difficulty experienced by some J apanese in fully 
developing a sense of the self. 
It would appear that this leaves us in something of a di1emma. The 
maternal principle， amae， or some simi1ar emotional foundation for We-
consciousness is a necessary condition for human freedom. If we attempt to 
meet the needs arising from our interdependency through the paternal 
principle， we lose much of our autonomy. If， on the other hand， we follow 
the maternal principle alone， there is a danger that the self wi1 not fully 
mature. 
ReconciUation and Transcendence 
The way out of this di1emma is through transcending the Oedipus and 
Ajase complexes. The Oedipus complex is fully transcended only when the 
119. See J. Van Herik， Freud on Femininity and Faith (1982). In a brilliant analysis of the 
Oedipus complex， she shows that Freud's theories of gender， religion and the Oedipus complex are al 
interrelated and inseparable. Because females are already “castrated" since they lack a penis.， there can 
be no fear of castration which will drive them through the complex. Rather they remain in a pre司
Oedipal state which Freud equates with wish-fulfillment. Judaism is a more advanced religion b巴cause
it renouces wish-fulfillment and is thus closer to the reality principle， while Christianity remains an 
expression of wishイ'ulfillrnent. Thus the asymmetry which Freud finds between male and female h巴
finds also reflected in the contrast between Judaism and Christianity. 
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gender gulf is healed within the individual psyche. Only then can the “1" 
and the “We" be in proper ba1ance in a ful1y developed self. The male 
must return to the mother， but only after the “1" is strong enough that the 
centre of the self can withstand the loss of boundaries entai1ed in reconcilia-
tion with the feminine. Simi1ar1y， the Ajase complex can only be 
transcended when the return to the mother takes place after the self is strong 
enough to retain its boundaries. The Ajase complex produces the wor1d of 
amae where Wかconsciousnessis strong and I-consciousness is weak， a wor1d 
of feeling with lit1e autonomy. The Oedipus complex produces a wor1d 
of authority and law， with litt1e feeling， and where freedom is an illusion. So 
long as human emotions， qualities and abi1ties are bifurcated along gender 
lines， and the care and nurturing of chi1dren are left exc1usively to women， 
we wi1 be in the grips of these or simi1ar complexes.12O 
As stated by Sagan，“the development of the psyche is the paradigm for 
the development of culture and society."121 The psychological problems of 
the separation-individuation process of the individual psyche of the child 
unfolds in the context of a protective and nourishing mother who never-
theless represents. “psychological death， the loss of boundaries"122 under 
the shadow of the paternal power of the father who exercises authority over 
both chi1d and mother. It is in this context of authority， power and 
dependency that we must seek the keys to understanding the evolution of 
legal consciousness in both East and West. 
For me， the Buddha of Justice found in the great hall of the Supreme 
Court Bui1ding symbolizes autonomy with feeling， and calls for a view of the 
self in which both I-consciousness and We-consciousness are strong and in 
balance. In assimi1ating fundamental rights J apan need not lose the tradi-
tional sense of amae which， according to Dr. Doi， isthe core of the J apanese 
soul. Individua1ity should be possible without alienation. If， however， the 
entire western legal and political tradition is taken over， inc1uding the 
western views of substantive justice or transcendant goodness， along with 
western ideologies such as uti1tarianism or Marxism， which reflect these 
ideals， then a dialectical tension wi1 exist which wi1 inevitably erode the 
sense of community which the J apanese presently enjoy. 
120. See D. Dinnerst巴in，The Mermaid and the Minotaur: Sexual Arrangements and Human 
Malaise (1976); N. Chodorow， The Reproduction of Mothering (1978); A. Rich， Of Woman Born 
(1976). 
121. Supra， not巴106at 364. 
12. J. Benjamin， .‘Shame and Sexual Politics" (1982) 27 New German Critique 151 at 15. 
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The cultural bifurcation between East and West has its origins in a para伽
digmatic shift which took place in both cultures with the recognition that 
sensed experience is subjective; that is to say， relative to the observer. The 
shifts， however， went in opposite directions. In the East， the awareness 
developed that the sensed properties of objects such as colour， temperature， 
texture and so on were the products of human experience， so reality was 
sought in the recognition that the differentiations of experience were 
illusory and that only pure undifferentiated experience out of which the 
differences arose was reaL This was the Brahman without differences in 
Hinduism， Nirvana in Buddhism， and the Tao in China. 
The paradigmatic shift which gave birth to western culture occurred with 
the Greeks with the evollJtion of science， mathematics and philosophy. 
Unlike the East， which sought ultimate reality in terms of pure experience 
unadulterated by conceptual thought， the Greeks sought ultimate reality in 
terms of theoretical constructs of a cosmic order of universallaw which they 
sometimes referred to as the logos. The success of the Greeks in mathe-
matical astronomy， inthe formulation of the laws of harmony in terms of 
mathematical relations， and the formulation of geometry into a logical 
deductive system culminating in Euclid's Elements， laid the foundation for 
their faith in reason， which faith took its ultimate form in Stoicism. It was 
Stoicism which gave birth to the western juridical tradition. The basic 
epistemological presuppositions of Stoic science and Stoic morals and law 
are thus much the same.123 
With the radical transformations in twentieth century physics， stemming 
in particular from Einstein's theories of relativety， Heisenberg's uncertainty 
principle， and Bohr's concept of complementarity， there appears to be a 
convergence between the views of ultimate reality of East and West. This 
convergence has been the subject matter of a spate of books in the last few 
years.124  
It should be kept in mind that there is no single quantum view of reality， 
in that quantum physics does not give us “a single metaphor for how the 
universe actually works"， inthe way Newtonian physics did. In fact， a 
number of possible views of reality are consistent with quantum physics， 
123. See Smith， Smith & Weisstub and Northrop， supra， note 84. 
124. See Northrop， supra， note 54; F. Capra， T涜eTao of Physics (1975); M. Talbot， A司ysticism
and the New Physics (1981); G. Zukav， The Dancing Wu Li Masters (1979); H. Yukawa， Creativity 
and Intiution (1973); A. de Riencourt， T涜eEye of Shiva (1980). 
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and not al of these are consistent with eastern metaphysics. A number， 
however， are， including the most influentia1， cal1ed “the Copenhagen Inter-
pretationぺwhichcame out of Nie1s Bohr's Copenhagen Institute戸5
The point 1 wish to make is that a convergence between the eastern 
and western wor1d views has clear1y started to take p1ace， a1though some 
versions of each are more compatib1e than others. If a convergence between 
eastern. and western metaphysics is possib1e， and this wou1d certain1y appear 
to be the case for some branches of western metaphysics， then a convergence 
shou1d be possib1e between any mora1 or ethica1 theories which can be 
derived from them and which share simi1ar basic presuppositions. 
Lega1 and politica1 theory contain both express and implicit ideas about 
the se1f. Our conceptions of the se1f are a product of our menta1life. This 
being true， it is folly for 1ega1 and politica1 theorists to ignore psych010gy， 
psychoana1ysis and psychiatry戸6 A1bert Einstein attested to the impo子
tance of psychoana1ytic socia1 theory for stab1e wor1d politica1 order when in 
1932 he wrote to Sigmund Freud， seeking some s01ution， s01ace or hope in 
the face of his know1edge of the potentia1 for the release of atomic energy， 
and the threat of impending war in Europe.127 In response Freud wrote: 
Our mythological theory of instincts makes it easy for us to find a formula for 
indirect methods of combating war. If willingness to engage in war is an effect of 
the destructive inst泊ct，the most obvious plan wil1 be to bring Eros， itsantagonist， 
泊toplay against it. Anything that encourages the growth of emotional ties between 
men must opefIlte against war. These ties may be of two kinds. In the first place 
they may be relations resembling those towards a loved 0句ect，though without 
having a sexual aim. There is no need for psychoanalysis to be ashamed to speak of 
love in this connection， for religion itself uses the same words:‘Thou sha1t love thy 
neighbour as thyself.' This， however， ismore easily said than done. The second kind 
of emotional tie is by means of identification. Whatever leads men to share impor-
tant interests produces this community of feeling， these identifications. And the 
structure of human society is to a large extent bas巴don them.128 
Freud's suggested s01ution to the prob1em posed by Einstein appe訂 sto 
Correspond somewhat with the Japanese concept of amae. Thus the cure 
125. See N. H巴rbert，Quatum Reality (1985). 
126. See for examp!e Smith & Weisstub， supra， note 61; J. C. Smith，“The Sword and Shie!d of 
Perseus: Some Mytho!ogica! Dimensions of the Law" (1983) 6 Int'! J. of L. & Psych. at 235，“Gods 
and Goddesses of the Quadrant: Some Purther Thoughts on The Mytho!ogical Dimensions of the 
Law" (1985) 7 Int'! J. of L. & Psych. at 219; E. Promm， Escape F子omFreedom (1941); S. Milgram， 
Ob吃dienceto Authority (1974); M. Moore， Lawand 1ちychiatry(1984). 
127. Leter from Einstein to Preud (30 July 1932) in“Why War"， Standard Edi・tion，supra， 
note 47， vol. 22 (1964) 194 at 199. 
128. Id. at 212. See also “Civilization and Its Discontents"， id.， vol. 21 (1961) ch. 5， 57at 
108-16. 
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recommended by one of Japan's leading psychiatrists for the alienation 
suffered by western man， and the solution to war postulated by the greatest 
psychologist produced by the western world， also converge. 
